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Copyright in the European Economic
Community'
Jean-Franqois Verstrynge"
INTRODUCTION

In the middle of the negotiations on the Software Directive,' the
negotiators told the following story: This is the story of a surgeon,
an engineer, and a software analyst who were trying to decide
whose job was the oldest, and they had a very active argument
about it. They went back very far in time, to the Bible, to try to
make a decision. The surgeon said, "Well, when God created Eve
he took a rib from Adam to do that, and that's a surgeon's job; so
my job is the oldest." The engineer looked at him and said, "No
way. Even before that, God separated the waters from the earth,
and that's an engineer's job. My job is the oldest." The computer
software analyst looked at them and said, "No. In the beginning
there was chaos. That's my job."
From time to time, when we have to harmonize complicated
technical and political issues in copyright in the European Economic Community ("EEC" or "European Community" or "Community"), it really does look like chaos.
The Commission of the European Communities ("Commission")
entered this area very late. There had been international harmonization for more than a century.2 Many of the developed countries

t This speech was presented at the Fordham Conference on International Intellectual
Property Law and Policy held at Fordham University School of Law on April 15-16,
1993.
* Director, Cohesion Funds, Secretariat-General of the European Community, Brussels; Leuven University, LL.B. The views expressed here are those of the author and are
not necessarily the views of the Commission.
1. Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,
91/250/EEC, O.J. L 122/42 (1991) [hereinafter Software Directive].
2. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
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had very detailed national provisions in place. The question really
was: What should the Community really do in the Software Directive, especially since the EEC Treaty3 does not give jurisdiction to
the Community, a priori, to deal with intellectual property and
copyright, and we received jurisdiction only indirectly through the
derogation of Article 36 and the Notification of the Single Act in
Article 100a?
But it became quite clear in the 1970s that differences in intellectual property law, and in particular in copyright law, were going
to block the internal market. In the Coditel cases,4 you have a
clear copyright violation when you broadcast from one country to
another; the copyright laws do block the transfer. In the Patricia
case,5 the copyright is of a different duration in different Member
States, and the market is blocked after the copyright is filed in one
country. In the Warner case, 6 it is the same thing--different regimes of rental rights were at issue and therefore the copyright
blocked the market.
In 1985, when we launched the White Paper7 for the 1992 program, we included a certain number of measures to liberalize the
internal market through the harmonization of intellectual property.
Copyright is only mentioned in one sentence-in a sentence which
says that we will do "the fair thing." We did prepare to look at the
copyright area.
We issued the Green Paper8 in 1988. The Green Paper was

revised, Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 423 U.N.T.S. 305.
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958), amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741.
4. S.A. Compagnie Gdneral pour la Diffusion de la T6lvision v. Cin6 Vog Films,
Case 62/79, [1980] E.C.R. 881, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362; Coditel S.A. v. Cind-Vog Films
S.A., Case 262/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3381, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 49.
5. E.M.I. Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export, Case 341/87, [1989] E.C.R. 79,
[1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 413.
6. Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, Case 158/86, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. 684.
7. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final.
8. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Copyright and the
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very strongly criticized by some of our Member States-France,
Italy, and Germany, more particularly-and by many of our
rightsholders' organizations. It was criticized for being too economical, not cultural enough, too segmented, too impartial, and not
having a global vision of a global copyright.
It is true that in the Green Paper we have selected those topics
for harmonization where, in our view, it looked like there was the
biggest need for harmonization. These were areas where technology had advanced since the last revision of the Berne Convention.9
These were areas where technology could threaten copyrights,
through copying and piracy. We thought that we could leave the
rest less harmonized because the national regimes were to a certain
extent similar.
This, as it turned out, was not possible. The Commission was
under pressure from some Member States, from the European Parliament ("Parliament"), and from interested' circles to change its
approach. We did change our approach when we presented the
new program of action for 1991 and 1992. It addressed the previous issues but was much more focused on a global approach.
The negotiation on the Software Directive' ° was especially complicated because the key problem-reverse engineering-had not
been properly investigated by the Commission and was not properly presented by industry in the hearing after the Green Paper. Industry told us it was not an important problem. When we tried to
harmonize by leaving this problem on the side, it turned out that
this was impossible and we had to lay down a very specific derogation on reverse engineering.
It is very strange that the Community, which was the last institution to enter the copyright field, turned out to be the one which
had to do the most advanced legislative job. There had been no
reverse engineering provision in any legislation in the world; there
had been no case law in America or anywhere else on reverse engi-

Challenge of Technology, COM(88)172 final [hereinafter Green Paper].
9. Berne Convention, supra note 2.
10. Software Directive, supra note 1.
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neering at the time. Now we have the Sega case." There was no
solution in our Member States' laws, and we couldn't make industry agree on what solution there should be on reverse engineering.
So, as the last entrant in this field, we turned out to be the most
advanced legislator-and I can assure you that the negotiation on
reverse engineering was very complicated.
A. Software Directive
The Software Directive 12 was adopted in May 1991. Most of
our Member States have now transposed it or are on the verge of
transposing it. A few Member States are going to be late-Spain,
Portugal, and Belgium-but we do not believe that there will be
major difficulties with the implementation of the Software Directive, except one. The problem is in the United Kingdom, where
the government would like to maintain the fair dealing derogation
in its law with regard to software. This, of course, we cannot
have.
The Software Directive has listed exhaustively the derogations
for copyrights, which include copy and error correction and reverse
engineering. A fair dealing derogation in the Software Directive
is unacceptable. If the United Kingdom doesn't change its position, I think the Commission will have to take the United Kingdom
to court on that point. We told them before the Software Directive
was adopted that this was our position.
B. Rental Directive
The Rental Directive 3 is, from the corporate point of view, not
such an important Directive; it's a very small part of copyright
protection. But the Rental Directive has a misleading title because,
in fact, it is a Directive which has several parts, one of which relates to rental rights. But the second chapter of the Rental Directive fully harmonizes all neighboring rights in Europe. 4

11.
12.
13.
and on

Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
Software Directive, supra note 1.
Council Directive of 19 November 1992 on Rental Right and Lending Right
Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property,

92/100/EEC, O.J. L 346/61 (1992) [hereinafter Rental Directive].
14. Id. arts. 6-10.

19931

DEVELOPMENTS IN EEC COPYRIGHT

In most of our countries, we have a system, not known in the
United States, which gives statutory rights to performing artists,
phonogram producers, and broadcasters. For the fight against piracy, the position of these rightsholders, in the music sector especially but also in the movie sector, is important. We have a situation
where these rights were developed at an unequal level. They were
even missing in some of our countries because not all of our countries have ratified the Rome Convention.15 We wanted to fill all
these gaps.
We took the highest level of protection of neighboring rights
we could find, given its exclusive form, and we proposed to harmonize neighboring rights for artists, phonogram producers, and
broadcasters-and at a later point, we added film producers to
that-totally. We succeeded in the. sense that we have given
rightsholders durational rights, reproduction rights, and distribution
rights, including importation, with the normal exhaustion of these
rights in the European Community but not with exhaustion outside
6
of the EEC.1
We have ruled on the broadcasting right. We have also included something on communications in total, and, of course, rentals.
This means that for all these neighboring rights there is now total
harmonization in the Community. This was not so controversial
inside the EEC. Even the United Kingdom and Ireland, which
didn't know too much about neighboring rights, accepted that approach quite easily.
More controversial was the rental provision itself because we
had a situation in the Community where some of our countries
have exclusive rental rights-the rightsholder can decide whether
or not he permits rental. But some other countries, like Germany,
have limited rights where the government lays down the price of
the rental, more or less, and anybody who pays that price can rent.
Of course, in this type of system, the rightsholder loses control of

15. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, Rome, 496 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter Rome Convention].
16. Rental Directive, supra note 13, arts. 6-12.
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the exploitation. For example, if he wants to push sales rather than
rental, he can't do so because people can rent the copyrighted work
by just paying the price.
It took us quite a while to push Germany out of that position.
The Netherlands also had that position, although they had only a
draft law and not an enacted law. But it took us quite a while to
push Germany out of this position, to go back to the stronger form
of copyright protection, which is the exclusive rental right. But we
got there.
We got there by including equitable remuneration in the Rental
Directive. This is what created a lot of controversy. The Directive
said that, of course, there is an exclusive right for rental, but that
once you use this right to authorize rental, you have to give equitable remuneration to all previous rightsholders."7
The question then becomes: What is equitable remuneration?
We have refrained from laying that down exactly in the Directive
and left it open for collective negotiation.
We have also refrained in this Directive from dealing with the
issue of whether or not our Member States would give national
treatment for the rental right. They are free to choose.
But now you have to understand the specific feature of Community law, which is that when the Community legislates domestically on something, it acquires the jurisdiction to deal with the
same issue internationally. So, although our Member States are
free under the Rental Directive to choose national treatment or not,
when we go into future negotiations for the General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") or with the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") or any other multilateral negotiation, it
is the Community which will be making the decision and not the
Member States. We clearly indicated in the GATT negotiations,
and also with WIPO, that as far as rental is concerned, we could
accept national treatment.
In the WIPO documents, and indeed in the draft GATT Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
17. Id. art. 4.
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("GATT TRIPS text"), 8 there is a provision regarding the rental
right. It is not complete because it leaves rental rights in a less
protected position. But nevertheless, there is a provision on rentals
in the GATT TRIPS text. So we have here an advance above the
Berne Convention level of protection both in the EEC and presumably, when the GATT TRIPS text is accepted, in GATT.
The deadline for transposing the Rental Directive has not
elapsed. The deadline is July 1994 and for one particular provision, July 1997.19
There is one particular point I think I have to go into because
it is complicated. It involves cinematographic works. As in
WIPO, we have in the EEC the difficulty of two different copyright
regimes: a continental one, which focuses on the physical person
and on creation; and the Anglo-Saxon one, which focuses more on
exploitation and the rights of the producers. Thus, we have the
same difficulty inside the Community as we have internationally.
We have tried to bridge these differences in certain ways. One
way is to give parallel rights to the rightsholders, the authors or
artists, and to producers by including the producers in the category
of neighboring rights and making the rights equal on both sides.
We did this in particular for phonogram producers and also for film
producers. 20 The film producers did not like it too much.
The net effect of this is, nevertheless, that if you have parallel
exclusive rights, you can only exploit them if there are contracts
between these various rightsholders. You cannot rent a movie
unless the copyright holder gives you the okay; nor can you rent a
movie unless the film producer gives you the okay. And so, creating parallel rights has at least the effect of forcing these
rightsholders to talk to each other and to agree with each other.
Moreover, we included in the Rental Directive a rather compli-

18. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991), Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade In Counterfeit
Goods (Annex III).
19. Rental Directive, supra note 13, art. 13.
20. Id. art. 2.
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cated system for presumptions of transfer of these rights whenever
a contract has been concluded. It is a nonrebuttable transfer except
on one point: it's a free market.2 '
But we tried to build the regime in such a way that it would
achieve several objectives: (1) increase the level of protection and
provide strong support of rights; and (2) at least to a certain extent,
bridge the differences between the continental and the Anglo-Saxon
regimes.
This bridge was done on the substance of the exploitation
rights. Of course, if you come to a situation where it's a different
person who is the rightsholder of the same right, you have a problem: you're still stuck with the situation where the market is
blocked because one person has the right in one country and an
additional person has the right in a different country. This is the
case with cinematographic works. We couldn't finish the harmonization of rentals without delving into that extremely controversial
question.
We took a compromise position, saying that the principal director of a film would be the author; so we chose basically the continental regime. But we left open a door for the Member States to
indicate additional persons as co-author, so that the United Kingdom and Ireland could maintain a film producer in the category of
"co-author" next to the film director.22
C. DatabaseDirective
In the Database Directive 23 we have made a proposal for a dual
system. The first layer of the system is copyright, and it basically
gives protection in electronic databases under the regime of Article
2(5) of the Berne Convention.24 However, we have strengthened
it in that we have the regime of Article 2(5), but also protect databases if the content of the databases are not copyrightable through
a sui generis regime. But for the rest, we use essentially the crite-

21. Id. art. 2(7).
22. Id. art. 2(2).
23. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases,
COM(92)24 final-SYN 393.
24. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(5).
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ria of the Berne Convention, Article 2(5). The difference of language between the French and the English versions of Berne were
ironed out by saying clearly in the Directive that it was the "selection or arrangement" which was protected by copyright.
There are very complicated issues involved in the Database
Directive. Because it's new and the Council of Ministers ("Council") is very busy with the other directives, there has only been a
preliminary discussion in Parliament and in the Council, and I
cannot really say at this moment where it is going.
But it is a very important Directive because it is clear that, with
the international harmonization of copyrights for books, for music,
for movies, for many other things, most of the exploitation in the
future will be in electronic form. Thus, it is a Directive which will
have a very serious impact in the future and not just for the databases.
D. Term Directive
Another proposal, which was not in the Green Book, but we
nevertheless filed, is the proposed Directive on duration of copyright protection.25 We have a very confused situation in the EEC
as far as duration of copyright and neighboring rights is concerned.
The Berne and the Rome Conventions lay down minimums: Berne
is fifty years after the death of the author; Rome is twenty years
after publication. Our Member States have used this freedom about
these conventions to have all sorts of regimes. In Germany, it is
life plus seventy years; in France, it's life plus fifty years; in Spain,
it's life plus sixty. It is a totally chaotic situation.
Plus, on the neighboring rights, the duration varies. There is
even a strange situation in Italy, where on certain neighboring
rights they have totally different provisions in force at the same
time depending on what statute you choose.
When these rights expire in one country sales from that country
are blocked in countries where the rights are of longer duration.
So we said, "We can't have this." It's not so much that we wanted

25. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, COM(92)602 final-SYN 395.
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to prolong the copyright, but if we chose to shorten copyright, we
run into problems of acquired rights under the case law of the
European Court of Justice. Thus, we chose to escape those problems and to take the highest point. This means seventy years after
the death of the author for everybody on copyright and fifty years
after publication for everybody on neighboring rights.
Here again, Germany was resisting because it had twenty-five
years of protection for phonogram producers. It took us quite a
while to convince them to adopt this position.
The proposed Term Directive is not yet adopted, but it was in
a very advanced stage in the discussion in the Council a couple of
weeks ago. I believe that it is going to be adopted in June of
1993. We have come to the position where the last points will
26
have to be ironed out.
As to authorship, there seems to be a compromise which is
promoted by certain countries which would say that it would be the
life of the principal director plus seventy years. This is a regime
which no Member State has at the present time in the Community.
(It was included in the recent Swiss law.) It seems to have some
chance to be passed. Of course, the United Kingdom and Ireland
would be in a position of keeping producers as co-authors during
the duration of protection for the copyright and for the life of the
cinematographic work. So I think that has a good chance of passing.
My last point is the question of whether some works can come
back from the public domain. It's clear that if one work is still
protected in one country but has lapsed in other countries, it would
have to be protected in all countries as if the longest duration had
been in force. In countries where the Commission originally proposed it, there is now seemingly an agreement that we will bring
these works back from the public domain. We will leave the
Member States to deal with the acquired rights.

26. [Eds. note: The Term Directive was adopted by the Council of Ministers in
final form on October 29, 1993 (unpublished text on file with the Fordham Intellectual
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal)].
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E. Satellite and Cable Directive
Another proposed Directive which has been rather controversial
is on satellite and cable.27 As you know, here again there are two
chapters in this Directive: one deals with satellite, the other deals
with cable.
For satellite, we have proposed a sort of integrated Community
right so that you will clear copyright at the point of emission-there is a dispute about how you define "emission"-but
once you have cleared copyright there for the whole zone of imprint, then you cannot use the copyright or neighboring rights to
block the broadcast of. this particular work. For cable, where they
pick up the signal and retransmit it, we have made that subject to
payment and to collective negotiations. There have been some lastminute, minor detail changes in the text. I don't have the final text
to give you because it hasn't emerged in time for this conference.
The combination of these various Directives-software, rental
and neighboring rights, duration, and satellite-forms a package in
that they are the architecture of our system. We could very well,
if need be, stop the system here, stop the harmonization here, and
it would be a functional regime-provided all of our Member
States would ratify the proposed Directives.
We were not successful in that domestically, but we have included it in the agreement between the EEC and the European Free
Trade Association ("EFTA"), and we hope that agreement will
come into force at the end of this year. Although Spain has
blocked it for the moment, we think that it will be implemented.
F. Home-copying Directive
We have not been able to deliver on our promise to present a
private copying proposal. We promised that there would be one at
the end of. 1991. We made a very serious attempt at the end of
1992 and failed.
27. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Coordination of Certain Rules
Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission, COM(92)526 final-SYN 358. [Eds. note: The Directive
was adopted by the Council of Ministers in final form on September 27, 1993 as Council
Directive No. 93/83, O.J. L 248/15 (1993).]
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Private copying has always been very controversial since the
Green Book. There are different opinions. Some Member States
are opposed to it. We tested the waters in the Council several
times. We believe that there is a majority in the Council in favor
of this harmonization. But there is a dispute going on in the Community clearly, and in the Commission also, about how to deal
with the rights of third-country rightsholders and private copies.
It is on this point that we have not reached agreement in the Commission, and for the moment there is no proposal.
This is unfortunate. It is unfortunate because it will mean that,
for the time being, the Community will not have this higher level
of protection against private copying where private copying and the
technologies that go into private copying are increasing and the
losses which all rightsholders incur-all rightsholders, authors and
phonogram producers and artists, everyone-are increasing.
I think that there is a very serious danger that the Community
will copy the latest American and Japanese positions that there will
be protection against private copying only in certain respects. This
will mean a de facto reduction of the rightsholders' protection.
We have had hearings on many other issues of copyright, including program fees and moral rights. All of these issues are
blocked for the moment because the private copying problem has
not been disentangled. Since we did not promise in the working
program for 1991-1992 to make proposals-we only promised to
have hearings-it is for the new Commission to decide whether to
propose a private copying position. That decision has not been
made since, for the moment, the service of the Commission is
being reorganized, and there is a new Commissioner and a new
Director-General. There is no decision expected for some time in
the Commission.
G. European Economic Area and Similar Agreements
The last point which I want to make is that this program of
harmonization does not concern only the twelve countries of the
EEC. The agreement that we have signed with the EFTA countries
has a rule that the EFTA countries have to take over the harmonization of the Community in the greatest detail.
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So, for example, if we have a Software Directive, Sweden,
Norway, Finland, and Austria have to adopt the Software Directive,
too. They have to get rid of the rules on private copying and adopt
the Software Directive, or they have to get rid of international
exhaustion in Finland and Norway. This has been agreed. In the
future, when the satellite, or duration, or whatever other Directives
come into force, the mechanism is that they have to adopt the
Community legislation.
They have one escape clause against this, but the escape clause
is at the price that we block access of our markets to the EFTA
countries if they don't adopt a given piece of Community legislation. This is an extremely high price to pay and this gives an incentive to the EFTA countries.
We have included similar provisions, although less detailed, in
the agreements we have made with Eastern European countries, in
particular, with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland-which in
Czechoslovakia is going to be taken over by two separate regimes,
the Czechs and the Slovaks. After a certain time-five years---they
will have to have the same level of protection for intellectual property, including copyrights, as in the Community. So, of course, if
there is harmonization to bring the protection level up to a certain
point, that will also be the case in these countries at that time.
We have included the same provisions in the agreement we
have just signed with Romania and Bulgaria. We have a similar
provision in the commercial agreement with the Balkan Republic.
And we have the intention of using that for many other European
countries, except the Balkan Countries in which we want to have
an association with the Russian republics. We have now opened
negotiations with Russia and we have requested the same thing.
But I am personally much less convinced that we will convince
Russia. The Eastern European countries have the incentive of
wanting to join the EEC and are very willing to make these promises. Russia does not have this incentive. Russia has made a
promise to ratify Berne, it has said that it will also oppose the
requests of the EEC and of the United States to increase the level
of protection over there. That is very bad for software and for the
music sector.

